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The Power of State Constitutions in
Protecting Individual Rights*
THE HONORABLE STANLEY MOSK**

There may appear to be a sloecies of heresy in mentioning
alternatives to the United States Constitution during the period when
we are celebrating the bicentennial of that remarkable document. My
only response to any such criticism is that human liberty is so
fundamental that every avenue for its preservation must be explored.
As Justice Jackson wrote, "[wie can afford no liberties with liberty
itself.'"
Many trees have been felled to make the paper, and much ink is
being spilled, to provide the recent published articles extolling the
undoubted virtues of the United States Constitution. This is good. I
applaud the inflated interest in our great charter. Indeed, one hopes
some of the homage is heard and understood in a number of relatively
dark places in our nation.
There are times, however, when dependence on the United States
Constitution does not meet all the convolutions of a problem. Under
those circumstances one may find it expedient to look up to international instruments, or down to state constitutions. Since I have been
asked to discuss the latter, I will not dwell at any length on the
former, except to note that there have been times, and there will be
more, when courts will rely on international documents that have the
force of treaties for authority to protect individual rights.
Let us discuss the trend in state constitutional law. In so doing
my comments will be somewhat of a potpourri. Even if I were
presumptuous enough to believe I could, of necessity I will have no
opportunity to delve into any aspect in depth.
At the onset let me be realistic and recognize there are some
ominous signs in the field of state constitutional law. Rising crime
rates, particularly violent crime, is not the most healthy environment
in which to suggest the virtue of expanding individual rights. A
* This article is drawn from an address given to a joint meeting of the Illinois
State Bar Association and the Illinois Judge's Association in Chicago, Illinois on
November 12, 1987.

** Justice of the California Supreme Court
1. United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169, 180 (1952).
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heinous assault, forcible rape or child molestation arouse little public

compassion. In such circumstances some state legislators yield to

public clamor and seek to provide for the accused only the barest
minimum of basic rights. The minimum, of course, is in general what
the federal constitution and the United States Supreme Court provide.
Not only do legislators respond to what they perceive to be a
public demand, but in those states which have direct legislating by
the people-through the initiative-often there is such direct action.
We in California had that experience when a measure, known as
Proposition 8, was drafted by emotionally-charged groups, placed on
the ballot, given the seductive title of "Victims' Bill of Rights," and,
well, who could oppose rights for victims? That the measure turned
the clock back on decades of thoughtful legislation and judicial
interpretation was given little, if any, consideration.
Yet this 200th anniversary year, as we observe the masterful
product and intent of our constitutional architects, we have a duty to
contemplate their concept of a federal republic. Basically, they declared time and again that they were creating a national government
of limited powers, that it was the states which had the duty to protect
the well-being of individuals.
True, a Bill of Rights-ten amendments-was added shortly after
1787 at the insistence of those who recalled the tyranny of the colonial
masters and would not subscribe to the Constitution unless the
criminally accused were assured due process and other minimum
guarantees. But at no time did the framers place a limit, or a cap, on
the protections the states could provide their citizens. Indeed, the
implication was clear that they fully anticipated the states would act.
As Justice Brandeis put it many years later, the states may be political
science laboratories, to experiment, to improvise, to test new theories.
If a state experiment succeeds, others may follow. If it fails, only one
2
of 50 states is affected.
One lesson we can learn is this: our founding fathers had faced
violence in the revolutionary war, just as we face violence in the
streets today; our founding fathers experienced quartering of soldiers
in their homes and rape of their wives and daughters, just as we
experience invasion of our homes by robbers, burglars and rapists;
our founding fathers had their property taken by force without
representation, just as we have our property forcibly taken by marauders.
2. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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Yet our founding fathers thought and spoke in terms of protecting
not merely all citizens by a requirement of due process, but primarily
those who are accused of crime. Yes, they were concerned about
victims. But they conceived of the accused as the potential victim of
government, thus to him went the guarantee of rights. But, as I shall
indicate, the guarantees were only the bare minimum.
Take, for example, the right of privacy. In courts throughout the
land, that somewhat elusive concept is being urged and generally
accepted. It must be placed high on any agenda.
I find it significant that in many respects state constitutions
protect individuals more expansively than does the United States
Constitution. For example, although the High Court has on occasion
found privacy to be among so-called penumbral rights, there is no
specific guarantee contained in the federal Bill of Rights. Article I,
section 1, of the California Constitution declares that among the
inalienable rights are: "pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and
3
privacy." That is typical of a number of other state constitutions.
For a scenario on this subject, let me observe that a police officer
or a public prosecutor may walk into a bank and, with no authority
of process, demand to examine the bank records of a named individual
or corporation. No constitutional violation, says the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Miller.4 But some states have
pointed out that one's cancelled checks, loan applications, and other
banking transactions are a mini-biography, that one reasonably expects his bank records to be used only for internal bank processes
and therefore an examination of them violates the state constitutional
right of privacy, unless the records are obtained by a warrant or
subpoena. 5 Does one reasonably expect privacy in his credit card
records, or his unlisted telephone calls? Tune in later.
To most of us, learning and knowledge are our most prized
possessions. Yet the United States Supreme Court has never recognized
education to be a fundamental right. Indeed, in San Antonio School
Dist. v. Rodriguez6 the court in 1971 specifically held that education
is not a fundamental right, and it has never retreated from that
position. Just last year it reached a similar conclusion in Papasan v.
Allain7 . The court has come no closer than Plyler v. Doe in which it
3. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
4. 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976).
5. Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr.
166 (1974).
6. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
7. 106 S. Ct. 2932 (1987).
8. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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applied a higher scrutiny standard to a statute that denied basic
education to alien, undocumented school-age children, but even under
that standard it reiterated that education is not a fundamental right
under the U.S. Constitution.
Contrast that result with the growing number of states, since
Massachussetts provided the first public school system in 1647, that
have recognized the inherent value of public education. California, in
its celebrated Serrano v. Priest9 case openly broke away from the high
court reticence and firmly declared that "the distinctive and priceless
function of education in our society warrants, indeed compels, our
treating it as a fundamental interest."' 0
Connecticut, Michigan, Wyoming, Arizona, Mississippi, Washington, Wisconsin and West Virginia have reached the same fundamental right conclusion."
High on the constitutional agenda in the next few years will be
Miranda, 2 and what, if anything, to do about it. I note the Supreme
Court has taken over the Patterson3 case from Illinois, but the issue
there appears to be whether Miranda gives enough protection to a
defendant, not too much.
Attorney General Meese has taken an extreme anti-Miranda
position, rejecting the right of a suspect to terminate interrogation
either by saying he wants to do so or that he desires to have the
advice of a lawyer. Instead, the recent report of his office calls such
persons uncooperative suspects and believes the police should be able
to undertake persuasion to induce the suspect to change his mind and
talk-translation: to confess.
There is a long list of doubters that this effort of the Attorney
General will succeed. The overruling of precedent prevailing for two
decades or more is a quiet, slow, patient process. It is usually
accomplished by steps, often in a succession of cases. It is seldom
done by press release.
9. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
10. Id. at 608-09, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
11. Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); Milliken v. Green,
389 Mich.1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972); Washakie Co. School Dist. v. Herschler, 606
P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980); Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973);
Clinton Municipal Separate School Dist. v. Byrd, 477 So.2d 237 (Miss. 1985); Seattle
School District v. Washington, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978); Buse v. Smith,
74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d
859 (1979).
12. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
13. Illinois v. Thomas, 116 Ill. 2d 290, 507 N.E.2d 843 (1987), cert. granted
sub nom., Patterson v. Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 227 (1987).
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In short, I believe, to paraphrase Mark Twain, the death of
Miranda is greatly exaggerated. But assume I am wrong. After all,
reversals of former precedent are not unprecedented. Remember
6
5
Lochner v. New York,1 4 Pace v. Alabama, Plessy v. Ferguson,1
Minersville v. Gobitis, 7 Swain v. Alabama, s and others.
Bear in mind that when Miranda was announced, many of the
states were reluctant to accept it. Some were dragged kicking and
screaming into conformity. But conform they did. The question will
be, if Miranda expires, will the states revert to their pre-Miranda
policy of anything-goes-at-the station house, or will they choose to
insist upon some form of Miranda-type warning under state constitutional authority?
I am convinced that unless the High Court should rule a Miranda
warning is absolutely forbidden-which seems utterly inconceivablemany, if not most, states will adhere to the state rules which they
adopted to conform to Miranda. It has taken two decades, but law
enforcement officers in the states have become reconciled to giving
appropriate warnings to suspects. And trial judges understand they
must reject statements obtained from defendants who were not warned.
Many of the state decisions have been based on state constitutions.
For example, in Harris v. New York 9 the Supreme Court permitted statements obtained in violation of Miranda to be used for
impeachment purposes. A number of states have held that if a
statement offends Miranda, it is useless for all purposes. Here is a
forthright declaration of state independence in People v. Disbrow:20
We therefore hold that the privilege against self-incrimination
of article I, section 15, of the California Constitution precludes
use by the prosecution of any extrajudicial statement by the
defendant, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, either as affirmative evidence or for purposes of impeachment, obtained
during custodial interrogation in violation of the standards
declared in Miranda and its California progeny. Accordingly,
we ... declare that Harris is not persuasive authority in any
2
state prosecution in California. 1
14.
15.
16.
17.

198
521
163
310

U.S.
F.2d
U.S.
U.S.

45 (1905).
812 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1061 (1976).
537 (1896).
586 (1940).

18. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
19. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).

20. 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
21. Id. at 113, 545 P.2d at 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
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To the same effect is State v. Santiago,2 a Hawaiian case, and
Butler v. State,23 a Texas case. Note this quotation from Butler:
Harris,of course, in no way obligates [state courts] to overturn
prior decisions as a matter of state criminal procedure ...
Therefore, we cannot agree with the [prosecution's] contention
despite the natural temptation to rush to accept the Harris
24
rationale. The beauty is only skin deep.
Another hole was dug in the exclusionary rule by the United
States Supreme Court in 1984. In United States v. Leon25 the Court
announced the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule:
suppression of evidence from the prosecution's case-in-chief is, as a
matter of federal law, appropriate only if the officers were dishonest
in preparing their affidavit for a search warrant.
The good faith doctrine was expanded to include reasonableness
in Maryland v. Garrison.26 There the Baltimore police actually invaded
the wrong apartment, but in a 6-3 vote, Justice Stevens held for the
court that the validity of the search depended on whether the officers'
2 7
failure was "objectively understandable and reasonable."
Several state courts, on state constitutional grounds, have declined to follow Leon and probably will do so as to Garrison. All the
cases to date involved searches conducted pursuant to a warrant later
determined to be invalid. Let me enumerate a few.
In State v. Novembrino,28 the court, in a lengthy opinion, refused
to follow Leon because: (1) its long run effect will be to undermine
the integrity of the warrant process by diminishing the quality of
evidence presented in search warrant application; (2) it "will ultimately
reduce respect for and compliance with the probable-cause standard";
(3) it is inconsistent with the state constitution as interpreted; (4) there
was no evidence that the criminal justice system was impaired by the
requirement of probable cause; and (5) there is no satisfactory alternative to the exclusionary rule.2 9
The New York court in People v. Bigelow ° declined to follow
Leon because it: (1) frustrates the exclusionary rule's purposes; (2)
22. 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971).

23. 493 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).

24. Id. at 198.

25. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
26. 107 S. Ct. 1013 (1987).

27. Id. at 1019.

28. 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820 (1987).

29. Id. at

,

519 A.2d at 854-56.

30. 66 N.Y.2d 417, 488 N.E.2d 451, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1985).
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places a premium on the illegal police action; and (3) provides a
positive incentive for "others to engage in similar lawless acts."'"
The Michigan court in People v. Sundling 2 rejected Leon because: (1) the magistrate's decision would, as a practical matter, be
insulated from appellate review; (2) the exception would result in
increased illegal police activity; and (3) the Court's claim that the
exclusionary rule is not working is not supported-indeed, is contra33
dicted-by the evidence.
In Stringer v. State,34 a Mississippi case, Justice Robertson declared that (1) the exclusionary rule is necessary so that it is "assur[ed]
that issuing magistrates take seriously their responsibilit[y]" to ensure
that people are free of unconstitutional searches; (2) if the exclusionary
rule "ain't broke, why fix it?"; and (3) that there is "neither a need
for change nor a reasonably effective and available alternative". 35 In
addition, Justice Robertson suggested that Leon undermines the in36
tegrity of the judicial process.
The Wisconsin court in State v. Grawein37 refused to employ
Leon because the state constitution and prior Wisconsin Supreme
Court decisions interpreting it hold that the receipt into evidence of
the fruits of an invalid search warrant violates the defendant's state
constitutional rights.3"
It would appear that if state courts can find other ways of
rejecting Leon and retaining the rule of excluding illegally obtained
evidence, they will do so.
Another significant federal-state conflict arises over the use of a
defendant's pretrial silence. All jurisdictions agree that, as held in
39 the silence of a defendant, under a claim of
Griffin v. California,
privilege against self-incrimination, may not be admitted in the prosecution's case-in-chief. But there is some divergence as to the use of
such silence for impeachment purposes.
Jenkins v. Anderson40 approved the prosecutor's use for impeachment purposes of a defendant's failure to surrender for two weeks,

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 424, 488 N.E.2d at 458, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 637.

153 Mich. App. 277, 395 N.W.2d 308 (1986).
Id. at 292, 395 N.W.2d at 314.
Stringer v. State, 491 So.2d 837 (Miss. 1986) (Robertson, J., concurring).
Id. at 849-51.
Id. at 850.
123 Wis. 2d 428, 367 N.W.2d 816 (1985).
Id.
380 U.S. 609 (1965).
447 U.S. 231, 235-38 (1980).
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when he claimed on the stand that the killing was in self-defense.
Most state cases agree, on a theory that the silence must amount to
an invocation of Fifth Amendment rights in order to be excluded.
After arrest, however, the dichotomy depends on whether Miranda warnings have been given. If so, Doyle v. Ohio41 controls.
Obviously it would be unconscionable to penalize a defendant for
remaining silent after he has been told by the authorities that he has
a right to refuse to talk.
However, if Miranda warnings have not been given, the U.S.
Supreme Court held in Fletcher v. Weir 42 that a defendant's constitutional rights are not violated by permitting him to be cross-examined
about his pre-Miranda silence. The court reasoned that because there
were no affirmative assurances as a result of the failure to give a
Miranda warning, no fundamental unfairness would arise from allowing the defendant's silence to be used for impeachment purposes.
Courts in Washington, Connecticut, Alaska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Texas and California reach a contrary conclusion. 43 The
latter relied entirely on the state Constitution."
Several of the foregoing state cases feared that to allow the
defendant's silence to be used for any purpose would invite the police
to dispense with Miranda warnings. They also expressed concern that
silence used for impeachment would likely be used by the jury in
determination of guilt.
A conflict is inevitable between national and state standards in
the field of obscenity. Under the U.S. Supreme Court rubric from
Miller v. California,45 material is obscene if (1) it depicts sexual
conduct in a patently offensive manner, (2) the average person,
applying contemporary state standards, would find that it, taken as a
whole, appeals to a prurient interest in sex, and (3) taken as a whole,
it lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.-

41. 426 U.S. 610, 616-20 (1976).
42. 455 U.S. 603 (1982).
43. Connecticut: State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517, 504 A.2d 480 (1986) (relying

on principles of evidence rather than on the Connecticut Constitution); Texas: Sanchez
v. State, 707 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Washington: State v. Davis, 38
Wash. App. 600, 686 P.2d 1143 (1984); Alaska: Nelson v. State, 691 P.2d 1056
(Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Turner, 499 Pa. 579, 454
A.2d 537 (1982); New Jersey: State v. Deatore, 70 N.J. 100, 358 A.2d 163 (1976).
44. People v. Jacobs, 158 Cal. App. 3d 740, 751, 204 Cal. Rptr. 849, 857 (Cal.

App. 2d Dist. 1984).

45. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
46. Id. at 23-25.
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Recently in the case of State v. Henry"7 a proprietor of an adult
bookstore was convicted after his entire inventory was seized in a
police raid. The Oregon Supreme Court declared that its state Constitution was written by "rugged and robust individuals dedicated to
founding a free society unfettered by the governmental imposition of4
some people's views of morality on the free expression of others."
Oregon's pioneers intended to protect freedom of expression "on any
subject whatever," including the subject of sex. In rejecting the Miller
rule, the court declared "[i]n this state any person can write, print,
read, say, show or sell anything to a consenting adult even though
that expression may be generally or universally considered 'obscene. '49
There is no better example of how the states can be laboratories
°
for development of the law than the fate of Swain v. Alabama. In
that case the majority of the United States Supreme Court held that
there could be no limitations whatever on the exercise of peremptory
challenges.
A modest concession was made if a defendant could demonstrate
a long pattern of discriminatory use of the challenges.
This, of course, was an utter impossibility. How could a defendant, while jury selection was underway, demonstrate that the prosecutor had employed discriminatory tactics in x-number of previous
cases in which, of course, this defendant was not involved and in
which the racial characteristics of previous jurors was not recorded?
California specifically rejected Swain in a case entitled People v.
Wheeler." The state court held that there could be a limitation on
peremptory challenges if they were employed for a discriminatory
purpose. The method of ascertaining the systematic exclusion of a
cognizable group was described in detail, and if a prima facie case of
discrimination was evident, the trial judge could call on the prosecutor
to explain each of his challenges. If he flunked that test, the entire
jury panel was to be excused and a new panel brought in to start the
52
proceedings over. Massachusetts adopted much the same procedure
and a number of other states have acted similarly.
3
Lo and behold, last year in Batson v. Kentucky the United
States Supreme Court admitted that Swain is not workable, and
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

302 Ore. 510, 732 P.2d 9 (1987).
Id. at 523, 732 P.2d at 16.
Id. at 525, 732 P.2d at 18.
380 U.S. 202 (1965).
22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748 (1978).
Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1979).

53. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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finally conceded that the use of peremptory challenges for racially
discriminatory purposes must not be condoned. This suggests the old
adage: wisdom too often never comes, so one ought not to reject it
merely because it comes late. It also demonstrates how state courts
can have a significant effect on the pattern of the law, even federalmade law.
Motor vehicles present a particular problem as courts at every
level grapple with the boundaries of permissible searches.
If a person is stopped by a police officer for a simple traffic
violation, the motorist may find himself subjected to a full body
search and his vehicle searched. No constitutional violation, says the
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Robinson 4 and
Gustafson v. Florida.5 But Hawaii 6 and other states have found such
police conduct offensive to state constitutional provisions unless the
officer has articulable reasons to suspect illegal conduct other than
the minor traffic infraction.
I must add that most courts have difficulty in ascertaining the
limits, if any, of automobile searches in light of more recent federal
opinions. If a vehicle is stopped on mere suspicion, may the car be
searched without a warrant? The glove compartment? The trunk? A
closed container in the trunk? And if the vehicle is a van with a bed,
kitchen, closet, curtained windows, etc., does it have the qualities of
an automobile because it is mobile, or is it entitled to the protections
of a home because one lives in it? These are areas in which the states
are likely to reach independent and varying conclusions.
The right of police to inventory the contents of an impounded
motor vehicle results in another conflict between United States Supreme Court and state court decisions. In South Dakota v. Opperman5 7
the High Court held inventory searches of automobiles to be consistent
with the Fourth Amendment. And in the recent case of Colorado v.
Bertine58 the court justified the inventory as a means to protect the
police and garage attendants from subsequent false claims of theft.
Colorado, however, reached a different conclusion59 as has California. 60 Since property could conceivably disappear prior to or during
the inventory process, both states believed a simpler solution would
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

414 U.S. 218 (1973).
414 U.S. 260 (1973).
Hawaii v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974).
428 U.S. 364 (1976).
107 S. Ct. 738 (1987).
People v. Bertine, 706 P.2d 411 (Colo. 1985).
People v. Mozzetti, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1971).
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be to merely lock and seal the automobile in a secure parking facility.
The Mozzetti case was particularly egregious: the woman was not a
criminal suspect, she had been in an automobile accident and had
been taken to the hospital. It is difficult to justify the police searching
her car trunk and examining a closed suitcase on the back seat, all
on an inventory theory.
My favorite federal-state dichotomy is in the history of a not
uncommon factual situation: a small, orderly group of citizens undertakes to pass out leaflets, or to solicit signatures on petitions, in a
privately owned shopping center. The shopping center owners seek to
prohibit that activity.
Obviously there is a built-in tension between two constitutional
guarantees. On the one hand the citizens assert their right of freedom
of speech, and the right to petition their government for a redress of
grievances. On the other hand, the shopping center owner asserts his
right to control his private property and to exclude all non-business
related activity. In that conflict which right is to prevail?
In 1970, the Supreme Court of California held in Diamond v.
Bland61 that unless there is obstruction or undue interference with
normal business operations, the bare title of the property owners does
not outweigh the substantial interest of individuals and groups to
engage in peaceful and orderly free speech and petitioning activities
on the premises of shopping centers open to the public. This, of
course, is subject to reasonable time, place and manner restrictions.
On four occasions the shopping center owner sought certiorari
and rehearing from denial of cert., and in each instance he was
62
rebuffed by the High Court, with no votes noted to grant. We had
every reason to believe Bland was acceptable law.
Two years later, however, the Supreme Court took over an almost
3
identical case from Oregon, and in Lloyd v. Tannere held that the
owners had the right to prohibit distribution of political handbills
unrelated to the operation of the shopping center.
Back to the California Supreme Court came the Diamond v.
Bland owners and asked to be relieved from the previous orders. A6
Tanner. 4
4-3 majority of our court agreed we were bound by Lloyd v.
61. Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970),

cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 874 (1971), reh'g denied, 405 U.S.

981, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 897 (1972).
62. Id.
63. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
64. Diamond v. Bland, 11 Cal. 3d 331, 521 P.2d 460, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468
(1974).
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At this point I shifted gears. In our original opinion we had
relied on the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and
to such cases as Marsh v. Alabama65 and Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Plaza.66
The second time around I urged the same result under "unmistakable independent non-federal grounds upon which our earlier
opinion could have been based." ' 67 But for the moment a majority of
our court retained consistency with federal law.
I said "for the moment," for five years later in 1979, a new
majority of our court decided in Robins v. Pruneyard6 that the free
speech provisions of the California Constitution offer "greater protection than the First Amendment now seems to provide.' '69
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Robins v.
Pruneyard,70 and I must confess we sensed doom to our theory of
state constitutionalism. But, to our delight, the Supreme Court agreed
with us, 9-0. 7 1 Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion that declared the
reasoning in Lloyd v. Tanner "does not ex proprio vigore limit the
authority of the State to exercise its police power or its sovereign right
to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive
than those conferred by the Federal Constitution .... '"'
No doubt there is a growing interest in true federalism. There
was a time when states' rights were associated with Orval Faubus and
George Wallace barring the entrance of Blacks to public schools. We
are long past that confrontational period.
Today states' rights are associated with increased, not lessened,
individual guarantees. There is every indication, particularly since
Pruneyard,that the Rehnquist court will defer to the states when they
rely on state constitutional provisions. Thus I urge you to constantly
look to your state Constitution, to its history and to its provisions.
Don't let anyone tell you that state Constitutions are merely
redundant, even when their text is similar to that contained in the
federal Constitution. Bear in mind that state charters did not get their
inspiration from the United States Constitution. It was the converse:
the framers of the federal charter adapted almost all of the Bill of
Rights from the charters of the original states.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

326 U.S. 501 (1946).
391 U.S. 308 (1968).
See supra note 60.
23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979).
Id. at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
447 U.S. 74 (1980).
Id.
Id. at 81.

1988:651]

MOSK

At the top of any agenda is a review of James Madison's words
in The Federalist (No. XLV):
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
federal government are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.
The former will be exercised principally on external objects,
as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which
last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected.
The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the
objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the
lives, liberties, and properties of the people and the internal
73
order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
Sound policy 200 years ago. Sound policy today.

73. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (J. Madison) (Mentor ed. 1961).

